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I. INTRODUCTION
In its divided 2014 decision in Sierra Club v. Jewell,1 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
plaintiffs who observe landscape have Article III standing to
sue in federal court to protect those views even if they have no
legal right to physically enter the private property that they
view. Two earlier decisions had reached similar conclusions,
but have had little impact. The D.C. Circuit's decision could
significantly enlarge the ability for plaintiffs to sue federal
agencies or private parties over changes to private lands that
the plaintiffs have no right to enter.2 Because the Supreme
Court has inconsistently applied both strict and liberal
approaches to standing, it is difficult to predict how it would
decide this issue. If it addresses whether plaintiffs must have
a legal interest in any property they seek standing to protect,
the Supreme Court might be forced to resolve the
contradictions in its standing doctrine.
Part II explains the basic principles of constitutional Article
III standing. Part III addresses the district court's initial
decision rejecting standing and the divided D.C. Circuit
decision finding standing in Sierra Club v. Jewell. Part IV
examines two prior decisions concluding that observers have
standing to challenge changes to property they do not own or
have a right to enter. Part V discusses how the Supreme Court
might address the issue of standing rights for those who view
private lands they have no right to enter.
1. 764 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Judge Sentelle dissented from the majority opinion
written by Judge Srinivasan and joined by Judge Garland. Id. at 3, 3-9 (majority
opinion), 9-11 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
2. David LaRoss, D.C. Circuit Decision Could Broaden Environmentalists' Legal
Standing, INSLDEEPA.COM, Oct. 9, 2014, available at http://insideepa.comldaily-
news/dc-circuit-decision-could-broaden-environmentalists-legal-standing (subscription
required).
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II. INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE III STANDING 3
While the Constitution does not expressly require that each
plaintiff prove standing to file suit in federal courts, the
Supreme Court has interpreted Article III's limitation of
judicial authority to actual "Cases" and "Controversies" as
imposing standing requirements. 4 The Supreme Court has
created a three-pronged test for constitutional Article III
standing that requires a plaintiff to show that: (1) she has
"suffered an injury-in-fact," which is (a) "concrete and
particularized" and (b) "actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; '5 (2) "there [is] a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be
fairly... trace[able]" to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some
third party not before the court;"6 and (3) "it [is] likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision." 7 A plaintiff bears the burden of proof
3. The discussion of standing in Part II relies upon my earlier standing articles cited
in footnote *.
4. The constitutional standing requirements are derived from Article III, Section 2,
which provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies
between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;
between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and fbreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (footnote omitted); see DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547
U.S. 332, 340-41 (2006) (explaining why the Supreme Court infers that Article III's
case and controversy requirement necessitates standing limitations and clarifying that
"[ilf a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding
it"); see generally Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers and Standing,
59 CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 1023, 1036-38 (2009) (discussing a scholarly debate on
whether the Framers intended the Constitution to require standing to sue).
5. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
6. Id. at 560-61 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
7. Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
308 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 40:2
for all three elements.8 Thus, for a federal court to have
jurisdiction over a suit, at least one plaintiff must prove he has
standing for each form of relief sought.9 Federal courts must
dismiss a case for want of jurisdiction if no plaintiff meets the
constitutional Article III standing requirements. 10
As indicated above, standing requirements reflect core
constitutional principles inferred from Article III. For
example, standing doctrine bars unconstitutional advisory
opinions.1" Furthermore, standing requirements are grounded
in separation of powers principles, which establish the division
of powers between the judiciary and political branches of
government so that the "Federal Judiciary respects 'the
proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a
democratic society."' 12 Different justices of the Supreme Court
have disagreed, however, regarding the degree to which
separation of powers principles limit Congress's authority to
authorize standing to sue in federal courts for private citizen
suits challenging executive branch decisions. 13
8. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) (stating that parties
asserting federal jurisdiction must "carry the burden of establishing their standing
under Article III"); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (same); see also LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL
COURTS 336 (3d ed. 2009) (adding that a plaintiff may initially allege general facts
which, if true, would establish the three standing elements, but, at the summary
judgment stage, the plaintiff must argue these facts more specifically and with
additional support and must ultimately prove the existence of injury, causation, and
redressability).
9. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-52 (confirming that "a plaintiff must
demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought") (quoting Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000)).
10. See id. at 340-41 (emphasizing the importance of the case or controversy
requirement); Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180 (adding that courts have an affirmative duty at
the outset of the litigation to ensure that litigants satisfy all Article III standing
requirements).
11. See Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) ("Article III of the
Constitution restricts the power of federal courts to 'Cases' and 'Controversies.'
Accordingly, [t]o invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have
suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Federal courts may not decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them or give
opinion[s] advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.") (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
12. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 341 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750
(1984), partially abrogated by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992) (majority
opinion of Justice Scalia concluding that Articles II and III of the Constitution limit
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III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S DIVIDED DECISION IN SIERRA CLUB V.
JEWELL
The litigation in the D.C. Circuit involved efforts by plaintiffs
to preserve Blair Mountain, West Virginia, which in 1921 was
the site of the largest armed confrontation in U.S. history
between labor unions representing coal miners and coal
companies that hired 3,000 armed men to protect their
property interests from the miners. 14 After several days of
gunfire, President Harding sent federal troops to end the
fighting, and the coal miners surrendered. 15 In recent years,
several environmental and historical preservation
organizations sought to protect for the Battlefield from surface
coal mining by having it listed in the National Register of
Historic Places.' 6
In 2009, the federal government briefly listed the Battlefield
in the Register, but within days, the Keeper of the Register
removed the Battlefield after concluding that the desires of
area property owners had not been accurately reflected in the
nomination process.' 7  The plaintiff organizations sued in
federal district court challenging the Battlefield's removal from
the Register.'8 The district court granted summary judgment
against the plaintiffs, holding that they lacked Article III
standing because they failed to demonstrate the necessary
injury, causation, and redressability.19 In the majority opinion
written by Judge Srinivasan, the D.C. Circuit reversed the
Congress's authority to authorize citizen suits by any person lacking a concrete injury
and citing several recent Supreme Court decisions for support), with Lujan, 504 U.S. at
580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Congress has the power to define injuries and
articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none
existed before."), and Lujan, 504 U.S. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the "principal effect" of the majority's approach to standing was "to transfer power into
the hands of the Executive at the expense-not of the Courts-but of Congress, from
which that power originates and emanates"). See generally Heather Elliott, The
Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 496 (2008) (suggesting the "disagreement"
is "[u]nsurprising[" and arguing that courts should not use standing doctrine "as a
backdoor way to limit Congress's legislative power").





19. Id. at 3-4.
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lower court's decision and held that the plaintiffs had standing
to challenge the Keeper's decision.20 Judge Sentelle dissented
and argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing because
they did not have a "legally protected interest" in viewing
property, nor a legal right to access. 21
A. The District Court's Decision Denying Article III Standing
The district court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish
any of the three requirements for standing: injury in fact,
causation, or redressability. 22 First, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs did not prove that the alleged injury was "actual
or imminent."23  While "a considerable amount of the
Battlefield [wa]s... currently subject to surface mining
permits," the court determined that there was no actual or
imminent injury because the coal companies had yet to mine
the Battlefield under their existing permits, which in some
cases had been dormant for several years, and it was unclear
whether they would mine the land in the near future.24
Because it found that there was no actual or imminent injury,
the district court did not discuss whether viewing another
person's property could constitute an injury sufficient for
Article III standing.25
Second, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs failed to prove
standing causation because their concerns about the mining of
the Battlefield depended on "speculative predictions about the
actions of third parties, the coal mining companies," and not on
the actions of the government defendant. 26 Third, although
federal and West Virginia mining law generally imposes
prohibitions on surface mining on property listed in the
Register, 27 the court concluded that a favorable court ruling
requiring the Battlefield to be listed would not redress their
potential injury because such prohibitions contained an
20. Id. at 3, 5-9.
21. Id. at 9-11 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
22. Sierra Club v. Salazar, 894 F. Supp. 2d 97, 110-14 (D.D.C. 2012).
23. Id. at 110 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Id. at 110-12.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 113.
27. Id. at 114 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(3)).
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exemption for permits with valid existing rights.28 The district
court reasoned that the coal companies probably had valid
existing rights because their permits had been acquired before
the historic district's inclusion in the National Register, and
therefore "surface mining would be permitted on the Blair
Mountain Battlefield" even if the Keeper relisted the
Battlefield. 29 Because the plaintiffs had failed to establish
Article III standing, the district court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment.30
B. The D.C. Circuit's Majority Opinion
A majority of the D.C. Circuit panel concluded that the
plaintiffs had established Article III standing and, therefore,
reversed the judgment of the lower court.31 The D.C. Circuit
determined that the plaintiffs' aesthetic interest in viewing of
the Battlefield constituted a concrete and particularized, and
actual or imminent, injury.32 The court observed that Supreme
Court and D.C. Circuit precedent clearly established that the
purely aesthetic interests of a plaintiff in viewing property or
animals are sufficient for standing injury.33 Several members
of the plaintiff organizations submitted declarations stating
that their enjoyment of viewing the Battlefield would be
diminished if the coal companies mined the site.34
Amicus West Virginia Coal Association argued that the
plaintiffs could not show an injury in fact because the
individuals whose interests would be injured by mining of the
Battlefield owned no legal right to enter the Battlefield area. 35
The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that the plaintiffs had
submitted no evidence that they "possess[ed] any legal
entitlement to set foot on the privately owned property,"




31. Sierra Club v. Jewell, 764 F.3d 1, 5-9 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
32. Id. at 5-7.
33. Id. at 5 ("The Supreme Court has recognized that harm to 'the mere esthetic
interests of the plaintiff ... will suffice' to establish a concrete and particularized
injury.") (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009)).
34. Id. at 5-6.
35. Id. at 6.
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the site. 36 However, the D.C. Circuit concluded that it was
irrelevant whether they could physically enter the Battlefield
because they could view it from public roads or surrounding
areas without committing a trespass. 37 Because they could
view the property from public lands or surrounding areas, the
court reasoned that the plaintiffs did not need a legal interest
in entering the Battlefield to have a cognizable standing
interest in viewing the site.38 "Accordingly, there [wa]s no
reason that the cognizability of aesthetic and associated
interests in a particular site could turn on owning a legal right
to enter or view the property."39
The D.C. Circuit relied on circuit precedent and a Ninth
Circuit decision supporting its position that a standing injury
may result from government actions that could interfere with
aesthetic viewing of another person's property.40 In a 1988
D.C. Circuit decision, the court had found a standing injury by
"rely[ing] solely on impairment of the affiant's ability to enjoy
the 'natural vistas' of the nearby hills from her own home,
regardless of the absence (or existence) of any legal right on her
part to view or make an entry onto the nearby hills."4 1 In its
2001 decision Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, the Ninth Circuit
declared that "[i]f an area can be observed and enjoyed from
adjacent land, plaintiffs need not physically enter the affected
area to establish an injury in fact."4 2 The D.C. Circuit adopted
the Cantrell decision's position that plaintiffs who view another
person's property may have standing.43
Even though there was as yet no surface mining at the
Battlefield, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated an "actual or imminent" standing injury by
showing that there was a "substantial probability" of mining at





40. Id. at 6-7.
41. Id. at 6 (quoting Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 714-15 (D.C. Cir.
1988)).
42. 241 F.3d 674, 681 (9th Cir. 2001). Part IV will further discuss the Cantrell
decision.
43. Jewell, 764 F.3d at 6-7.
44. Id. at 7.
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there was a substantial probability" of mining at the site in the
near future, the court observed that "coal companies have
mined in the vicinity of the Battlefield under permits that
encompass the Battlefield."45 Additionally, the plaintiffs had
demonstrated that two active permits encompassed the
Battlefield area, and introduced a report showing that surface
mining was moving closer to the site. 46 The government did
not challenge the plaintiffs' report.47 While the district court
had concluded that mining on the Battlefield in the near future
was speculative because the permits to mine the site had
remained dormant for over ten years, the D.C. Circuit observed
that a letter from the coal companies' attorney objecting to the
listing of the Battlefield in the Register had stated that the
companies planned to mine the site, and concluded that there
was therefore a "substantial probability" of mining at that
location. 48 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit held that the plaintiffs
had established "that its injury is 'actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.' ' 49
Next, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs met the
second and third parts of the standing test: causation and
redressability. 50 The court observed that the causation and
redressability issues overlapped because both depended upon
whether inclusion in the Register would protect the Battlefield
from surface mining.51 The district court concluded that the
plaintiffs had failed to establish standing causation and
redressability because it thought it probable under West
Virginia law that surface mining would continue even if the
Battlefield were relisted.52 However, the D.C. Circuit agreed
with the plaintiffs' argument that "even if surface mining could
continue upon a relisting of the Battlefield, West Virginia law
affords additional protections to places listed in the Register,"




48. Id. at 7-8.
49. Id. at 8 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000)).
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on the landscape of a protected site.53 While there was some
dispute about whether the duty of minimization only applied to
initial as opposed to renewed permits, the D.C. Circuit
"conclude[d], however, that for purposes of demonstrating
causation and redressability, there [wa]s an adequate
possibility that the regulation would apply to renewals of those
permits and not only to the initial applications."54 Because the
plaintiffs raised a "non-frivolous" interpretation of West
Virginia law suggesting that mining companies would have a
duty to minimize harm at the Battlefield if it was listed on the
Register, the D.C. Circuit determined that their argument was
sufficient "to establish causation and redressability. '5
Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit held that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated Article III standing, and reversed the judgment
of the district court and remanded the case for further
proceedings.56
C. Judge Sentelle's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Sentelle argued that
plaintiffs must have a legal interest to enter a parcel of
property to establish standing.57  While noting that the
majority opinion was correct that a mere aesthetic injury may
suffice to establish a concrete and particularized injury for
Article III standing, he contended that "this does not establish
that the legally protected aesthetic interest of would-be
plaintiffs encompasses the legally protected right to peer into
the property of others."58 Additionally, although the majority
demonstrated from precedent that a defendant's injury to flora
or fauna that harms a plaintiffs aesthetic interests may
constitute a standing injury in some circumstances, Judge
Sentelle reasoned, "Nonetheless, none of these cases would lead
me to suppose that my neighbor has a legally protected right
that I have invaded when I trim the grass and behead the
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 8-9.
56. Id. at 3, 5-9.
57. Id. at 9-11 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 10.
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clovers, which he enjoys viewing."59  Because the plaintiffs
lacked any legal entitlement to enter the Battlefield, he
maintained, "neither have they put forth any evidence of any
legal entitlement to view that property. '60 Since the Supreme
Court in its 1992 decision Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
required "parties invoking federal jurisdiction [to] bear the
burden of establishing an "invasion of a legally protected
interest," Judge Sentelle reasoned that the plaintiffs had failed
to establish a standing injury because they "offered nothing to
establish the invasion of any such interest."6 1 Accordingly, he
concluded, "The dismissal of this action should be affirmed." 62
IV. OTHER DECISIONS FINDING STANDING TO SUE TO PROTECT A
RIGHT TO VIEW OTHER PEOPLE'S PROPERTY
In its 2001 decision Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, the Ninth
Circuit held that birdwatchers who had no right to enter a
property owned by the U.S. Navy had standing to sue to protect
their right to view birds on that property. 63 Similar to the
views of Judge Sentelle, the district court decision in Cantrell
had denied standing because the court reasoned that the
plaintiffs had no legally protected interest in the naval station
property and, therefore, no right to view birds on the
property. 64 However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the
district court and concluded:
[W]e have never required a plaintiff to show that he has a right
of access to the site on which the challenged activity is occurring,
or that he has an absolute right to enjoy the aesthetic or
recreational activities that form the basis of his concrete interest.
If an area can be observed and enjoyed from adjacent land,
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 10-11 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
In a footnote, Judge Sentelle argued that a plaintiff must have a "legally protected
interest" to have standing, and that the majority's reliance on cases using the term
"cognizable interests" did not change the fundamental requirement of a legal interest
for standing. Id. at 10 n. 1.
62. Id. at 11.
63. 241 F.3d 674, 680-82 (9th Cir. 2001).
64. Id. at 681.
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plaintiffs need not physically enter the affected area to establish
an injury in fact. 65
The Ninth Circuit based this conclusion on its interpretation
of the Supreme Court's decision in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.66 The Ninth
Circuit explained:
For example, the plaintiffs in Laidlaw had used specific areas in
and around a river to picnic, birdwatch, walk, and swim but
alleged that they would no longer be able to do so because the
river had been polluted by the discharges from the defendant's
facility upstream .... In finding that the plaintiffs had
established an injury in fact, the Laidlaw Court did not state
that actual use of the river by swimming, wading, or boating was
necessary to establish standing, and drew no distinction between
such activities and enjoying the river from the surrounding land
by hiking, camping, picnicking, and driving near the river.67
The Cantrell decision reasoned: "the plaintiffs have alleged a
concrete aesthetic injury because they assert that their ability
to view the birds and their habitat from the publicly accessible
areas surrounding the station will be drastically limited, if not
destroyed, by the Navy's actions."68  Thus, "the birdwatchers
have shown a concrete and particularized interest in observing
the birds and their habitat from land adjacent to the station,
and therefore have satisfied Article III's injury in fact
requirement." 69
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning was followed in a West
Virginia district court decision. In its 2014 decision Ohio Valley
Environmental Coalition, Inc. v. Consol of Kentucky, Inc., the
U.S. District Court for the District of West Virginia relied on
Cantrell and a similar California district court decision in
concluding that whether a plaintiff has a legal right to enter
property does not necessarily affect his standing to view that
65. Id.
66. Id. (discussing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2000)).
67. Id. (discussing Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181-82).
68. Id. (emphasis in original).
69. Id. at 682.
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property.70 The district court stated, "even if Ms. Branham
were not able to access any of the affected area, it is not
necessarily true that the lack of access would foreclose-
standing."71 The Court concluded that Ms. Branham's interest
in viewing at least a portion of the property at issue was
sufficient to give the plaintiff organizations to which she
belonged standing to sue even though there was some dispute
as to which lands she could access or view. 72
V. CONCLUSION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT MIGHT ADDRESS
THE ISSUE
It is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court might
address the question of whether a plaintiff may have standing
to view property that it may not legally enter. The Court has
sometimes applied standing criteria more strictly and
sometimes more loosely. In its Lujan decision, the Court
emphasized a strict application of the three-part standing test
discussed in Part 11.73 Specifically, Lujan imposed more
stringent standing requirements on private litigants
challenging government regulation of third parties than on
parties directly challenging government regulation that
allegedly directly injured them. 74
However, the Court partially softened Lujan's strict approach
to standing in certain environmental cases by subsequently
70. No. 2:13.5005, 2014 WL 1761938, at *14 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 30, 2014) (citing
Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 681 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e have never
required a plaintiff to show that he has a right of access to the site on which the
challenged activity is occurring, or that he has an absolute right to enjoy the aesthetic
or recreational activities that form the basis of his concrete interest. If an area can be
observed and enjoyed from adjacent land, plaintiffs need not physically enter the
affected area to establish an injury in fact."); Soda Mountain Wilderness Council v.
Norton, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1256 (E.D. Cal. 2006) ('The plaintiffs have standing
because the proposed action may affect the manner in which the private lands are
managed in the future, a cognizable interest despite the plaintiffs lack of a right to
access to the land. The declarations submitted by plaintiffs demonstrate that at least
some of the organizations' members regularly travel to the edges of the public
property.")).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 11-14.
73. 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Mank, No Article III Standing, supra note *, at
1534, 1581 (discussing Lujan's strict three-part standing test); supra Part II.
74. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992); Mank, No Article III
Standing, supra note *, at 1581.
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holding in Laidlaw that plaintiffs who avoid recreational or
aesthetic activities because of "reasonable concerns" about
pollution have a sufficient injury for Article III standing even if
they cannot prove actual harm to themselves or the
environment. 75  Christopher Warshaw and Gregory E.
Wannier, in a quantitative analysis of 1,935 lower court
opinions, demonstrated that, because of Laidlaw, most lower
courts currently do not actually apply more stringent standing
requirements to private litigants challenging government
regulation of third parties than to litigants directly challenging
government regulation that allegedly directly injures them. 76
Thus, it is not surprising that the Ninth Circuit in Cantrell
relied upon Laidlaw when concluding that a plaintiff may have
standing to challenge a defendant's actions harming the
plaintiffs aesthetic views of a property even if the plaintiff does
not have a right to enter that property. 77
Because the Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence
contains both strict and liberal interpretations, 7 it is difficult
to predict how it would decide whether a plaintiff has standing
to challenge actions affecting the aesthetic views of a property
he or she does not have a legal right to enter. The Court could
rely upon Lujan's definition of an injury in fact as "an invasion
of a legally protected interest" to require that a plaintiff must
have a "legal interest" in any property it seeks standing to
protect. 79  Judge Sentelle's dissenting opinion relied upon
Lujan's" legally protected interest" language in arguing that
plaintiffs must have a legal interest in the land they seek
75. 528 U.S. 167, 181-86; Christopher Warshaw & Gregory E. Wannier, Business As
Usual? Analyzing The Development Of Environmental Standing Doctrine Since 1976, 5
HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 289, 289-322 (2011) (empirical analysis of 1935 lower court
cases found that Justice Scalia's two Lujan decisions led to more dismissal of
environmentalist citizen suits, but that subsequent Laidlaw decision reversed that
trend); Mank, No Article III Standing, supra note *, at 1534, 1581-82 (contrasting
Lujan and Laidlaw decisions).
76. See generally Warshaw & Wannier, supra note 75, at 289-322; Mank, No Article
III Standing, supra note *, at 1581-82 (discussing Warshaw & Wannier).
77. Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 681 (9th Cir.2001) (discussing
Laidlaw decision); supra Part IV.
78. See Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note *, at 1534,
1581-82 (contrasting Lujan and Laidlaw decisions); see generally Warshaw & Wannier,
supra note 75, at 289-322 (same).
79. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; supra Part III.C.
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standing to view.80 Yet, as the Ninth Circuit correctly observed
in its Cantrell decision, the Court in Laidlaw appeared to be
unconcerned with whether the plaintiffs in that case owned
any of the river area they viewed.81
There are competing and contrasting policy arguments for
both broad and narrow standing for plaintiffs who seek
standing to sue to protect their aesthetic interests in viewing
lands they cannot enter. Environmentalists and nature
observers seeking to protect beautiful areas such as Blair
Mountain would usually advocate for broad standing rights for
plaintiffs who sue to protect their aesthetic interests in lands
they cannot physically access.8 2 The D.C. Circuit decision in
Sierra Club v. Jewell and the Ninth Circuit decision in Cantrell
marshalled strong precedent for recognizing standing for
nature observers because of a strong public interest in
preserving aesthetic beauty, even where the public has no right
to enter the property at issue.83 These two cases place more
weight on giving the public access to aesthetic beauty than on
the property rights of the landowners. However, property
rights advocates such as Judge Sentelle would argue that only
those with a legal interest in entering a property should have a
standing right to sue to protect it because a land owner's
interest in managing his property as he sees fit outweighs any
public interest in its aesthetic beauty for public viewers who
lack access rights to the property.8 4
If the Supreme Court addresses whether plaintiffs must have
a legal interest in any property they seek standing to protect, it
might be forced to face the contradictions or tensions between
Lujan's strict approach to standing and Laidlaw's more lenient
approach.8 5 Justice Kennedy has often been the swing vote in
standing cases on the current Court.8 6  Notably, he filed
80. Sierra Club v. Jewell, 764 F.3d 1, 10-11 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
81. Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 681 (9th Cir.2001) (discussing
Laidlaw decision); supra Part IV.
82. See supra Part III.B and Part IV.
83. Id.
84. See Part III. C.
85. See Mank, No Article III Standing, supra note *, at 1534, 1581-82 (contrasting
Lujan and Laidlaw decisions); see generally Warshaw & Wannier, supra note 76, at
289-322 (same).
86. Mank, Clapper, supra note *, at 215-16 n.20.
2015]
320 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 40:2
concurring opinions in both the Lujan and Laidlaw decisions;
accordingly, Justice Kennedy might the Justice who resolves
the tensions between the two decisions.8 7 By contrast, Justice
Scalia has usually sought to narrow standing rights in cases in
which private citizen suits seek to challenge the government's
alleged under-enforcement or non-enforcement of federal
statutes, notably environmental laws.8 8 On the other hand,
Justice Breyer's probabilistic approach to standing has sought
to expand standing rights in such cases.8 9
A future majority in an aesthetic preservation case, however,
might cite either the Lujan or Laidlaw decisions and ignore the
others, because that would be easier than addressing those
contradictions. Furthermore, some argue that the D.C.
Circuit's recent decision approving broader standing in the
Blair Mountain case is the result of President Obama's recent
appointments to that Circuit, including Judge Srinivasan,
which shifted that Circuit to a more liberal approach with
regard to standing when these appointments, in combination
with prior appointments by President Clinton, gave judges
87. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 197
(2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579-81
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
88. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492-94, 496-500 (2009)
(rejecting probabilistic proof of standing injury in case alleging that the Forest
Service's sales of timber from government lands failed to protect the public interest in
accessing and enjoying those lands and demanding that environmental plaintiffs
demonstrate a specific time and place where they suffer a concrete injury); Lujan, 504
U.S. at 573-78 (concluding that Articles II and III of the Constitution limit Congress's
authority to authorize citizen suits by any person lacking a concrete injury, requiring
environmental plaintiffs to demonstrate a specific injury for standing and thus
rejecting environmental suit alleging potential future harm to plaintiffs' aesthetic
interest in viewing endangered species in foreign countries at some possible future
time); Mank, Clapper, supra note *, at 240-49 (discussing Justice Scalia's strict
separation of powers approach to standing in general and in Summers and Lujan
decisions); see also Andrew C. Sand, Standing Uncertainty: An Expected-Value
Standard for Fear-Based Injury in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 113 MICH.
L. REV 711 (2015) (discussing Justice Scalia's stringent approach to standing in fear-
based and environmental cases).
89. See, e.g., Summers, 555 U.S. at 505-10 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (proposing
"realistic threat" and probabilistic approach to standing); Mank, Clapper, supra note *,
at 236-40, 249-54 (discussing Justice Breyer's probabilistic approach to standing in
general and in Summers and Clapper decisions); Sand, supra note 89 (discussing
Justice Breyer's liberal approach to standing in fear-based and environmental cases).
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appointed by Democratic presidents a majority on the Circuit. 90
Accordingly, how the Court addresses the issue might depend
upon future presidential appointments to the Court, and the
effect these appointments have in shifting it towards either the
environmentalist or property rights perspectives on standing.
90. LaRoss, supra note 2 (discussing concerns of "industry attorney" and
"conservatives" that President Obama's recent appointments to D.C. Circuit have
shifted that court to the left in general and especially to more liberalized standing); see
generally Jeffrey Toobin, The Obama Brief, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 27, 2014, at 24,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/27/obama-brief [http://
perma.cc/6DFZ-6999] (arguing that President Obama's recent appointments to D.C.
Circuit have shifted that court to the left in general).

